The Court of Appeal (CoA) has clarified the boundary between voluntary service and statutory employment rights by ruling that individuals classified as “volunteers” may nonetheless attain legal “worker” status if they receive hourly remuneration and are subject to professional standards of control.
Facts:
Mr. Groom served as a Coastguard Rescue Officer (CRO) for the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) from 1985 until his termination in 2020. While based at the Bembridge station on the Isle of Wight, Mr. Groom was one of some 3,100 officers who provided rescue services across the UK. Although the MCA officially classified these officers as volunteers who gave their time without a salary, the reality was that the role involved significant professional expectations. Officers were required to follow a strict Code of Conduct, attend mandatory training sessions, and maintain a reasonable level of attendance at emergency call-outs.
In May 2020, the MCA initiated disciplinary proceedings against Mr. Groom for reasons that were not the focus of this specific appeal. Following a hearing, his position was terminated effective 5 June 2020. Mr. Groom subsequently requested the right to be accompanied by a representative from the GMB Trade Union during his appeal meeting in July 2020, citing Section 10 of the Employment Relations Act (ERA) 1999, which grants this right to individuals who are classified as workers or employees. The MCA denied his request, maintaining that, as a volunteer, he did not possess the legal status required to trigger that statutory right.
Mr. Groom presented his claim to an Employment Tribunal (ET), which was dismissed. The Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT), however, set aside the ET’s order and substituted a finding that Mr. Groom was indeed a worker. The MCA appealed.
The core issue is whether a CRO, who is technically classified as a “volunteer,” qualifies as a “worker” under Section 230(3)(b) of the Employment Rights Act (ERA) 1996. This status determines whether they are entitled to specific statutory rights, such as the right to be accompanied at a disciplinary hearing.
Decision:
The CoA dismissed the appeal and upheld the EAT’s decision that Mr. Groom was a worker. The Court’s reasoning focused on the reality of the “wage-work bargain” and the modern statutory interpretation of worker status. The principal reason for finding that such a contract existed was the provision of hourly pay. Lord Justice Bean noted that, while true volunteers only receive expenses, CROs were entitled to an hourly rate in “compensation for disruption” to their personal lives. The Court held that payment in exchange for a person’s time is the “essence of remuneration”. Because the MCA offered pay and Mr. Groom provided personal service in response, a contract was formed each time he attended a qualifying activity.
The MCA argued that there was no “mutuality of obligation” because Mr. Groom could theoretically walk away from a rescue or training session at any time. The Court rejected this, stating that once a CRO arrived for duty, they were contractually bound to follow the Code of Conduct and obey reasonable instructions. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Professional Game Match Officials Ltd (PGMOL), the Court explained that a contract of employment or work can exist solely for the duration of a specific shift or task, even if there is no “umbrella” contract requiring the person to show up in the first place. The Court emphasised that determining “worker” status is a matter of statutory interpretation rather than just looking at the labels in a handbook.
Implications:
This case clarifies where the line is drawn between a “true volunteer” and a “casual worker,” a distinction that affects thousands of organisations. The Court, however, favoured the “substance over form” principle, which sent a clear message that an organisation cannot avoid employment law simply by labelling someone a “volunteer” or stating in a handbook that “no contract exists”. Where the underlying reality involves a “wage-work bargain” in which one person does work, and the other pays for their time, the law will see a contract. This forces organisations to audit their actual practices rather than relying on their written policies.
The case provides a vital test for what constitutes remuneration. “True volunteering” involves the reimbursement for actual out-of-pocket expenses, while worker status includes a flat hourly rate, be it in the form of a “stipend,” “honorarium,” or “compensation for disruption”.
The judgement solidifies the concept of “intermittent” worker status. Previously, many organisations argued that if a person could choose when to work and when to refuse a shift, then they could not be a worker. The Court has now firmly established that while there may be no contract in the “gaps” between shifts, a binding legal contract exists the moment the person starts the task. This aligns the voluntary sector with the “gig economy” precedents set by companies such as Uber.
